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TELEPHONE 
(801) 3 2 2 - 2 5 1 6 
FAX (801) 5 2 1 - 6 2 8 0 
MAY 2 4 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Case No. 900264 
Supplemental Authority 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This firm represents the Resolution Trust Corporation as 
receiver for American Savings & Loan Association, plaintiff and 
appellee, in Case No. 900264 which is pending before the Court. At 
this time, the case has been briefed, but oral argument has not yet 
been scheduled. 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this letter is to advise the Court that additional 
pertinent significant authority has come to our attention. 
Specifically, on or about April 23, 1991, the Utah Supreme Court 
entered its opinion in the case of Phillips v. Utah State Credit 
Union, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), a copy of which is attached. 
The Court's discussion on pages 20 through 21, and particularly 
footnote 9, is new Utah authority dispositive of the issue set 
forth in Point I of American's brief, pages 7 through 10, which is 
that the three-month limitations period for the filing of 
deficiency actions is not applicable to actions to enforce the 
separate obligation of a guarantor. 
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The Court's consideration of this matter is greatly 
appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Ted Boyer 
fc/ns^^uAA^ ft-* ^iy^^^x^t£^--
Anneli R. Smith 
ARS:dh 
Enclosure 
cc: Gerald M. Conder, Esq. 
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tiorari. However, 1 express no opinion on 
vvhether petitioner may present his claims on a 
r*ew petition for habeas corpus in the district 
court. That question has not been briefed nor 
presented to us for decision. I believe, there-
fore; that it would be premature for me to 
express any opinion on that subject. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring in the 
ftesolO 
I concur in the dismissal of the writ of cer-
tiorari. However, I cannot join in footnote 
^ne's statement of the standard for determi-
ning whether a subsequent writ for extraordi-
nary relief may be entertained by the trial 
£Ourt. As stated in Fernandez v. Cook, 783 
f .2d 547 (Utah 1989), a petitioner may raise 
issues of ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
nabeas corpus petition only upon a showing of 
unusual circumstances." Id. at 549-50; see 
tilso Dunn v. Coo*, 791 P.2d 873, 879 (Utah 
1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the 
fesuit). In the present case, we are not in a 
position to determine whether the requisite 
unusual circumstances" exist, as Justice 
fiowe notes. 
Hak\ Chief Justice, concurs in the 
concurring opinion of Justice Zimmerman. 
f. Two petitions for habeas corpus have already 
peen considered in this case by the trial court and 
(her court of appeals. There appears- to be no legal 
reason, however, why Earle should be denied the 
opportunity to submit a third such petition. His 
previous petitions were unsuccessful solely on pro-
cedural grounds. No court has yet considered the 
substantive merit of his allegations. 
Rule 65B(i)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that the court cannot consider a pet-
ition for habeas corpus if it is apparent that the 
legality or constitutionality of a petitioner's confi-
nement has been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus 
or other similar proceeding. The purposes of that 
rule are to discourage successive applications based 
upon the same grounds*. Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 
2d 118, 388 P.2d 412, 414 (1964), and to protect the 
courts against vexatious and abusive behavior by 
prisoners. Hurst v. Cook, IT) T.^d ltf», Itftb 
(Utah 1989). Rule 65B(i)(2), however, only bars 
successive proceedings involving identical issues. A 
conviction or sentence that has not yet been fully 
and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior 
habeas corpus proceeding should not be denied 
reexamination because of a procedural default. See 
Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036. The record in this case 
clearly demonstrates that the legality or constituti-
onality of Earle's habeas corpus petition has not 
been considered. He is therefore not barred from 
bringing another petition in the trial court. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Vail J. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890300 
FILED: April 23, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
Dale R. Kent, Salt Lake City, for appellant 
Byron L. Stubbs, Salt Lake City, for appellee 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter: 
HALL. ChieL Justice: 
Defendant Utah State Credit Union 
("USCU") appeals an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah 
granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff 
Vail J. Phillips and directing USCU to release 
and reassign a note and mortgage held as 
security, together with all proceeds due or to 
become due thereon. USCU alsa appeals the 
final judgment and order of the district court 
entered after trial of the same matter. 
On November 18, 1980, Phillips borrowed 
$150,000 from USCU for the purpose of 
purchasing real property located in Tooele 
County, Utah. As security for the loan, Phil-
lips gave USCU a note and a trust deed to the 
property. As additional security for the loan, 
Phillips assigned to USCU a note and mort-
gage which he owned as mortgagee with 
Central Ranches, Inc., fka Deseret Springs, 
Inc. ("Central Ranches"), as mortgagor.1 
Phillips failed to make payments on the note, 
and on October 29, 1985, USCU served him 
with a written declaration of default on the 
note, which declaration was> - recorded on 
November 21,1985. 
In November 1985, Phillips received a check 
from Guardian Title in the amount of $27,850 
made payable jointly to Phillips and USCU 
pursuant to the terms of the assignment of the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage. Phillips 
did not disclose to USCU that he had received 
this check, but held it without negotiating it 
for approximately one year. 
Pursuant to the notice of default, a 
trustee's sale was held on April 29, 1986, on 
the Tooele County property. The property was 
purchased by USCU at that sale for the sum 
C O D E • c o 
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of $90,000. The balance due on the note at the 
time of the sale was $112,566.30, leaving 
$22,566.30 unpaid on Phillips' debt after the 
sale. 
In November of 1986, USCU received a 
letter from Guardian Title inquiring why the 
1985 check received by Phillips had not been 
negotiated. This was the first notice that 
USCU had concerning the existence of the 
1985 check. 
Phillips and USCU met later in November 
1986 to discuss the issuance of the 1985 check. 
USCU suggested that the check be placed in 
escrow with USCU until it was determined 
which party had a right to the proceeds from 
the Central Ranches note and mortgage. Phi-
llips refused to follow this suggestion and 
apparently tendered the check back to Guar-
dian Title, who issued a new check payable to 
Phillips and USCU in December 1986 as a 
replacement for the 1985 check. Phillips also 
received and held this check without informing 
USCU of its existence. 
On January 15, 1987, Phillips filed an 
action in the district court based upon 
USCU's failure to bring an action seeking a 
deficiency judgment upon the note pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §57 .1-32 .2 , Ph i l l ips ' 
action sought a reassignment of the Central 
Ranches note and mortgage and a release arid 
reassignment of any proceeds due or to 
become due under that note and mortgage. In 
its answer, USCU admitted that it had not 
filed an action to seek a deficiency judgment 
against Phillips for the remaining $22,566.30 
and admitted that the three-month period 
allowed under section 57-1-32 had expired. 
As its defense, USCU responded that it was 
not required to reassign the Central Ranches 
note and mortgage notwithstanding the 
running of the three-month period for brin-
ging a deficiency action. 
USCU counterclaimed against Phillips for 
the- remaining $22,566.30 due on the note. 
USCU claimed that it was not required to 
reassign the Central Ranches note and mort-
gage nor to release or return the proceeds 
from it but was entitled to retain the proceeds 
from that note and mortgage until the defici-
ency of $22,566.30 was fully satisfied. Phillips 
and USCU thereafter brought cross-motions 
for summary judgment based upon the plea-
dings filed in the case. 
In support of its motion for summary jud-
gment and in response to Phillips' motion, 
USCU argued that Utah's one action rule, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1,3 precluded it 
from seeking a deficiency judgment so long as 
additional becunty remained available for 
satisfaction of the debt. Therefore, USCU 
argued that it should not be required to bring 
a deficiency action within three months in 
violation of that statute and should be allowed 
to retain the Central Ranches note and mort-
gage, which had been validly assigned to 
USCU, to satisfy the remaining debt of 
$22,566.30. 
The trial court rejected these arguments and 
granted Phillips' motion for partial summary 
judgment on April 29, 1987. In its order, the 
trial court required USCU to reassign the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage, together 
with all proceeds due or to become due-under 
that note, to Phillips. USCU's motion for 
summary judgment was also denied at that 
time. USCU filed a request for interlocutory 
review of the trial court's decision, which 
request was denied by this court on August 20, 
1987. 
On May 12, 1989, a bench trial was held in 
the district court to determine the issue of 
damages. During this trial, the facts concer-
ning the issuance of the 1985 and 1986 checks 
were made known to the trial court. USCU 
renewed its counterclaim and requested 
damages for conversion of the 1985 check for 
$27,850. Final judgment was entered on June 
9, 1989, denying USCU's claim for conversion 
and upholding the partial summary judgment 
of April 29, 1987, which released the 1985 and 
1986 checks to Phillips as proceeds of the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage, but 
denying damages to either party. USCU now 
appeals the summary judgment granted to 
Phillips on April 29, 1987, and that portion of 
the June 9, 1989 final judgment denying its 
claim for conversion and allowing the proc-
eeds of the Central Ranches mortgage to 
remain the property of Phillips. 
Two issues are presented to this court on 
appeal: First, did the trial court err in requi-
ring defendant to release the assigned Central 
Ranches note and mortgage, together with the 
proceeds due and to become due under that 
mortgage, to plaintiff? Second, did the trial 
court err in denying defendant's counterclaim 
for conversion of the 1985 check because the 
action for conversion was not brought within 
three months of the nonjudicial sale of the 
trust deed property? 
The trial court granted Phillips' motion for 
summary judgment based upon its reading of 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. Because USCU 
had not brought a deficiency action against 
Phillips within three months, the trial court 
ruled that USCU was no longer entitled to 
proceed in any way against Phillips or the 
security interest he had given to USCU. The-
refore, the trial court ruled that USCU was 
not entitled to execute against the interest it 
held in the assigned note and mortgage and 
ordered USCU to release that note and mort-
gage to Phillips. 
Because disposition of a case by summary 
judgment denies the parties the benefit of a 
trial on the merits, we review the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom the judgment was granted.4 
Where, as here, summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law based upon the 
20 Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union 159 Utah Adv, Ren. 18 
C O D E • CO 
Provo, Utah 
pleadings rather than as a matter of fact, we 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions, 
giving them no particular deference, but i 
review them for correctness.5 
Section 57-1-32 sets. forth the procedures 
and standards for filing, a legal action to i 
recover the balance remaining on a debtor's I 
obligation after a nonjudicial sale of property 
securing the obligation. By implication, the act 
also prohibits further legal action against the 
debtor which is not.in compliance with its 
provisions.* Therefore, once the three-month 
period for filing a deficiency action has 
passed, no further action may be had to seek a 
deficiency judgment against a debtor.7 
In both Cox and Concepts, Inc., the action 
contemplated by the creditor and denied by 
thettrial court through operation of section 57-
1-32 "was further legal action against the 
debtor. In Cox, the creditor sought to bring 
am action for a deficiency judgment against 
theft debtor after the three^month period for 
filing such actions had expired. Alternatively, 
thr jcreditor sought damages for breach of 
contract against the debtor, in Concepts, Inc., 
the creditor sought to void a prior trustee's 
sale of property because of a typographical 
error in the trustee's notice of sale^ The cre-
ditor in Concepts, Inc. had failed to bring an 
action within three months of the original 
trustee's sale and sought to avoid that sale 
and xe-seii the property, thereby giving itself 
an additional three months to bring a defici-
ency action against the debtor. The -Cox and 
Concepts, Inc. decisions prohibited deficiency 
actions filed against the debtors to proceed 
and prohibited other forms of legal action to 
proceed against the debtors because they had 
been filed more than three months after the 
trustee's sale of the trust properties. 
In this case,- USCU did not seek a deficiency 
judgment against Phillips. USCU had not filed 
suit^and had not threatened any further legal 
proceedings against Phillips. It had taken 
additional collateral beyond the property sold 
under Phillips' trust deed. USCU made a 
conscious decision to collect its remaining debt 
from this additional collateral, the proceeds of 
the note and mortgage which had already been 
assigned by the debtor. USCU contemplated 
that any further legal action taken to collect 
the remainder of Phillips' debt would be 
against a third party, Central Ranches, not 
against Phillips, the debtor. Therefore, this 
case differs from Cox and Concepts because 
USCU did not seek legal action against Phil-
lips beyond the three-month period required 
in section 57-1-32. 
Had USCU sought a deficiency judgment 
against Phillips, the trial court would have 
been correct in dismissing USCU's claim for 
that judgment. In this case, however, USCU 
did not seek a deficiency judgment against 
Phillips, but merely sought to retain its addi-
tional security. USCU's retention and use of 
this -additional security was not legal action, 
but merely a retention of its validly assigned 
security interest, and* was not the type of 
"action" against Phillips which is prohibited 
by section 57-1-32.* The effect of the trial 
court's ruling that required USCU to reassign 
the Central Ranches note and mortgage dep-
rived USCU of the ability to make use of the 
additional security it had bargained for and 
received in granting Phillips the initial loan. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering 
that USCU was precluded from retaining the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage and in 
requiring USCU to release that note* and 
mortgage to Phillips. 
We-therefore hold that where a creditor 
takes more than one item of security upon an 
obligation secured by a trust deed, the creditor 
is not precluded from making use of that 
additional security merely because the creditor 
has not sought a deficiency judgment withm 
three months'of a nonjudicial sale of one of 
the items covered by the trust deed property, 
nor is the creditor required to seek a defici-
ency judgment under section 57-T-32'r4n 
order to maintain its right to the additional 
security, so long as the security is applied 
toward the debt owed on the original loan. 
Because USCU did not lose its right to the 
proceeds of the Central Ranches note>'and 
mortgage by not bringing a deficiency action 
under section 57-1-32, USCU's counters 
laim for conversion of the proceeds from the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage should 
also be considered. Because Phillips executed 
upon the $27,850 held by Guardian Title for 
the 1985 check and collected the 1986, and 
last, payment under the Central Ranches note, 
there are no remaining "proceeds" for USCU 
to collect under that note and mortgage. 
Therefore, if USCU proved its claim for 
conversion, it is entitled to judgment against 
Phillips for the amount remaining on hisr loan 
obligation plus any other damages provable-by 
US<pU which are the result of the conversion. 
At trial, Phillips contended that USCU's 
conversion claim is one that would be precl-
uded under the three-month limitation in 
section 57-1-32. The trial court agreed with 
Phillips' characterization of the statute and 
held that USCU's claim for conversion was 
precluded because it was not brought within 
the three-month limitation period. Phillips' 
argument mischaracterizes the nature of 
USCU's conversion claim and the scope of the 
prohibition on further suits against a debtor in 
section 57-1-32. 
USCU's claim for conversion arises from a 
different factual situation than its right to sell 
or foreclose the property under the trust deed. 
Phillips' liability, if any, for conversion is 
founded upon his acts in holding the 1985 
check issued from Guardian Title without 
informing USCU of its existence or determi-
ning with USCU whose property the 1985 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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check was. Separate acts or obligations-of a 
debtor are still actionable within normal lim-
itations periods even after the three-month 
limitation found in section 57-1-32 has run.9 
Therefore, a claim for conversion of the 
1985 check from Guardian Title may still be 
maintained against Phillips although the three-
month period has run. If USCU can establish 
its .claim, then it is entitled to such damages as 
it can prove were caused by Phillips' conver-
sion of the check. " ' * " 
In Alfred v. Hihkleyyl9this court set forth 
the standards for a conversion of personal 
property: 
A conversion is an act of wilful 
interference with a chattel, done 
without lawful justification by 
which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession. 
The measure of damages of conve-
rsion is the full value of the prop-
erty. It requires such a serious int-
erference with the owner's right 
that the person interfering therewith 
may reasonably be required to buy 
the goods. Although conversion 
results only from intentional 
conduct it does not however require 
a conscious wrongdoing, but only 
an intent to exercise dominion or 
control over the goods inconsistent 
with the owner's right.11 
The trial court made the following findings 
of fact concerning Phillips' conduct in holding 
the check from Guardian Title. These findings 
of fact were not contested by Phillips at the 
trial court level, nor are they contested in 
Phillips' brief to this court. On October 29, 
1985, USCU served Phillips with a notice of 
default on the trust deed given in exchange for 
the loan on the Tooele County property. In 
November 1985, Phillips received a check 
from Guardian Title Company made out to 
him and to USCU in the amount of $27,850. 
This check was issued in conformity with the 
terms of the assignment of the Central 
Ranches note and mortgage, Phillips failed to 
disclose his receipt of the check during the 
entire default period under the deed of trust 
and also kept a subsequent check reissued in 
December 1986 as a replacement for the 1985 
check. USCU also contends that Phillips did 
these acts with knowledge that the proceeds of 
the Central Ranches note and mortgage were 
security for the loan given by USCU and that 
he was in default on that loan. These conten-
tions are supported by the record and by 
Phillips' allegations in his complaint concer-
ning the additional security. 
The acts of Phillips described above, com-
bined with the effect of our decision that the 
proceeds of the Central Ranches note and 
mortgage were rightfully the property of 
USCU, constitute conversion of USCU's 
ite Credit Union „ 
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check and its right to proceeds from the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage. There-
fore, USCU is entitled to damages for that 
conversion in the amount of its property 
converted by Phillips. The case is hereby rev-
ersed and remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of what, if any, damages should 
appropriately be awarded to USCU for Phil* 
lips' conversion of the 1985 proceeds- of the 
Central Ranches note and mortgage and for 
further proceedings consistent wi£h:>thrs 
opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chie£ Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. This second note and mortgage related to diffe-
rent property than that for which Phillips sought the 
loan from USCU and shall be hereafter referred to 
as the "Central Ranches note and mortgage." 
2. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 states in relevant 
part: 
At any time within three months after 
any sale of property under a trust deed, 
as hereinabove provided, an action may 
be commenced to recover the balance 
due.upon the obligation for which, the 
trust deed was given as security, and, in 
such action the complaint shall set forth 
the entire amount of the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, 
the amount for which such prorjertyjwas 
soidr and the fair market value thereof 
at the date of sale. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1 states: 
There- can be one action for the* rec-
overy of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage 
upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter. Judgment shall be given adju-
dging the amount due, with costs and 
disbursements, and the sale of mortg-
aged property, or some part thereof, fo 
satisfy said amount and accruing costs, 
and directing the sheriff to proceed and 
sell the same according to the provisions 
of law relating to sales on execution, 
and a special execution or order of sale 
shall be issued for that purpose. 
4. Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., 743 
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
5. See Creer v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 770 P.2d 
113, 114 (Utah 1989); Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 
1159; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., 
Inc., 731 P.2d 475, passim (Utah 1986). 
6. See Concepts, Inc., 743 P.2d at 1161; Cox v. 
Green, 696P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985). 
7. Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1161; Cox, 696 P.2d at 
1208. 
8. Cases in other jurisdictions have held that the 
retention ot additional security for a loan is not a 
wrrm A WW A W>*7 A M * T D C D A D T C 
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prohibited " action", against the debtor after a non-
judicial sale of the debtor's property. These cases 
allow a creditor to continue to pursue additional 
security pledged by the debtor despite antideftciency 
statute prohibitions on further action against the 
debtor. In re Forester, 529 F.2d 310, 316 (9th Cir. 
1976); Hull v Alaska Fed. Sav. & Eoan Ass'n of 
Juneau, 653 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1983); Redingkr 
Vr imperial Sav. & Loan Ass'nvf the North, 47 
Cat. ApfK.M4^ 50, 120 CaL RptK 575 0975); 
FmetUand v. Greco. 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463. 
46&* (1955)/ These cases are based upon statutes 
which allow no deficiency judgment against a debtor 
after a nonjudicial sale. 
*f43ee; e.g., Bank of Am. Nad Trust A Sav. Ass'n 
v. Hunter, 8 Cal. 2d 592, 67 F.2dT99, 102 (1937) 
(proviso requiring action for balance due to be 
brought within three months after sale was intended 
to prescribe time" within which deficiency action 
must commence and has no application n? action 
based upon independent obligation of guarantor); 
Willys of Mann Co. v. Pierce, 140 Cal.'App. 2d 
226/296 P.2d 25, 27 (1956) (unlawful detainer 
action was not barred by statute); Afeyer v. Thdmas, 
18 Cal. App. 2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1936) 
(action for conversion of the note rather than for 
personal judgment on the note allowed); Valley 
Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 663 P.2d 653, 665 
(1983) (anudefkiency statute inapplicable to indep-
endent obligation of guarantor); Nosker v. Trinity 
Land Co., 107'N M. 333, 757 P.2d 803, 807 (Ct. 
App.-1988) (lessee's action for conversion of equi-
pment outside subject matter of foreclosure action 
and thus not barred by res judicata). 
10.8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726 (1958). 
11.328P.2dat728. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Sylvia DWIGGINS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
MORGAN JEWELERS, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 890084 
FILED: April 30, 1991 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Ronald E. Dalby, Matthew J. Storey, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant 
John L. Black, Lewis B. Quigley, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff Sylvia Dwiggins appeals the "trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of defendant Morgan Jewelers. Dwiggins 
argues that trie lower court erred in determi-
ning that Morgan Jewelers did not ^breach a 
duty o f care or proximately cause Dwiggins1 
injuries as a matter of law. We~affhmTThe 
facts as alleged are insufficient to give rise to a 
duty on the part of Morgan Jewelers.
 b ' 
Dwiggins was _ shopping in the Morgan 
Jewelers store located in a strip mall at 2774 
West 3500 South in West Valley City when it 
was robbed on December 10, 1986. During the 
course of the robbery, one of the -robbers 
struck Dwiggins on the head with a crowbar. 
This Morgan Jewelers store had previously 
been robbed in December of 1981: The-store 
had no armed guard, an all-female staff at 
the time of the robbery, and a dummy camera 
that did not record or photograph. It also had 
two stationary and twa or three mobile eme-
rgency buttons ta notify the Peak-Alarm 
Company, which would then notify "the police. 
According to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a motion for" summary jud-
gment is* appropriate''only- when ncr genuine 
issue of material fact exists and:the° moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a "matter of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see a/sd IHamblin 
v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d I B S / 1 1 3 5 
(Utah 1990). In determining whether the lower 
court correctly found that there o was-no 
genuine issue of material fact, we View* the 
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. Id. 
-jOrdinarily, the question of negligence is a 
question of fact for the jury. Hunt v. Hurst, 
785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990), Thus, 
summary judgment is appropriate in neglig-
ence cases only m the clearest instances. Id. at 
415. Bare allegations of negligence unsuppo-
rted by facts, however, arc insufficient to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment. Id. 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1985), we held that an (innkeeper 
owes its guests a duty of ordinary care to see 
that the premises assigned to them are reaso-
nably safe for their use and occupancy. Id. at 
243. We noted that the security required is 
"commensurate with the facts and circumsta-
nces that are or should be apparent to the 
ordinary prudent person." Id. The degree of 
care will "vary according to the particular 
circumstances and location of the hotel" and 
includes protecting guests from the criminal 
acts of third parties. Id. In Beach v. Univer-
sity of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 & n.2 (Utah 
1986), we noted that the law imposes upon 
one party an affirmative duty to look after the 
safety of another only when certain special 
